First, the interventions provided opportunities for unsterilized interventions. Second, the monetary authorities were extremely sensitive to speculative activities in the market.
Although there were a few times that the growth rate exceeded 3%, the recovery was followed by the recession. In 1998 and 2002, the growth rate became negative, first time since Table A-2 shows: the monthly (percent) changes in stock prices and the yen/dollar rate; quarterly growth rate; inflation rate; and the BOJ view that is indicated in improve. In the beginning of 2003, the Japanese economy was in a precarious position. Stock market prices were declining and economic activities were "flat." The Nikkei stock price index declined to 7,600, one-fifth of the peak that was recorded thirteen years earlier.
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The decline in the stock prices weakened many financial institutions that held large amounts of equities on their balance sheets. The mood was near crisis, and any help, including interventions to prevent yen appreciation, was welcome and justifiable. From January to March 2003, interventions to stop yen appreciation when the economy was weak were understandable, although the frequency of 6 Since the index composition has been changed, the direct comparison of the Nikkei index of 2003 with 1989 is not totally accurate.
interventions was much higher than was the case under the Sakakibara-Kuroda regime (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) .
Interventions In May, stock prices reverted from their downward trend to an upward trend. The crisis seems to have been averted. Interventions continued, however, as appreciation pressure continued.
Intervention continued in May, June and July, keeping the yen/dollar rate most of the time between 116 and 120. There were 11 intervention days in May, 7 days in June, and 9 days in July. By September, the intervention was considered to have been a success in the sense that it prevented appreciation that would have pushed the Japanese economy off the recovery path. Stock prices had risen comfortably from the trough in April 2003.
However, from June to September, as the Japanese economic recovery seemed to have become more certain, and stock prices rose sharply, criticism from abroad became voiced more frequently. There were allegations that Japanese intervention was subsidizing exports, hurting U.S.
manufacturers. Japan, with large trade surpluses, should not intervene and by preventing appreciation, the pressure of dollar decline became an unfair burden imposed on the euro.
There was no intervention between July 16 and August 29, 2003. From July 16 until August 21, the yen/dollar rate stayed between 118 and 121. From August 21 to 29, the yen rate appreciated in small steps from 118.00 to 117.00. Toward the end of August, the yen started to appreciate further. In the process that the yen moved toward 117.00 (the intra-day high in Tokyo), interventions were conducted in the amount of 412 billion yen on August 29, when the yen appreciated beyond 117. The first defense line at this point seems to be 117.00.
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Once the intervention started, interventions continued on and off for 11 days (out of 13 business days)
between August 29 and September 16. These interventions were partly countering yen appreciation pressure that was built up on the speculation that the United States and Europe were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Japanese and other Asian countries' interventions, including
China's dollar peg policy. The yen/dollar rate stayed between 116.00 and 118.00.
Toward the end of August, criticism of intervention had been circulated in the United States and in some European countries. Nevertheless, interventions continued in the first half of September.
On September 11, Secretary Snow was reportedly to have said that Japan must keep intervention to a minimum. This stimulated speculation to be long on the yen. There was a large We reaffirm that exchange rates should reflect economic fundamentals. We continue to monitor exchange markets closely and cooperate as appropriate. In this context, we emphasize that more flexibility in exchange rates is desirable for major countries or economic areas to promote smooth and widespread adjustments in the international financial system, based on market mechanisms.
The market interpreted the paragraph in the communiqué as criticism by the United States and European countries of the exchange rate policies of China and Japan-massive interventions and the piling up of foreign reserves. 10 The yen appreciated to 112.10 yen/dollar on Monday, September 22-a jump of 2 yen over the G7 weekend.
With the disclosed data of interventions, we now know that interventions did not take place from September 17 to 29-and rumors of no-intervention had it right at the time. Many market participants thought that the Japanese authorities were told by other G7 countries not to intervene.
The Japanese authorities publicly said that there had been no change in Japanese exchange rate (The authorities intervened even on the days when the Japanese financial markets were on holiday-January 2 and 12.) The per-day intervention amount ranged from 2 billion yen on January 26 to 1,664 billion yen on January 9. The size of the January intervention amounted to 7 trillion 10 Japanese officials privately argue that this paragraph of the communiqué was directed at China, but not Japan. However, several officials in Europe, when publicly asked, did not deny an interpretation that the paragraph was applicable also to Japan. 11 Again, no officials even privately confirm such a defense line interpretation. We reaffirm that exchange rates should reflect economic fundamentals. Excess volatility and disorderly movements in exchange rates are undesirable for economic growth. We continue to monitor exchange markets closely and cooperate as appropriate. In this context, we emphasize that more flexibility in exchange rates is desirable for major countries or economic areas that lack such flexibility to promote smooth and widespread adjustments in the international financial system, based on market mechanisms.
The second sentence was interpreted by the market participants as endorsement to Japanese intervention if it was to reduce "excess" volatility. The additional clause of "that lack such flexibility" qualified the "major countries or economic areas." Since the yen had appreciated by about 14% in the 14 months period prior to this statement, the market interpreted that the qualification excluded Japan from "major countries" that are urged to allow flexibility. This time, the market participants took it as the endorsement of the Japanese intervention policy between the two G7 meetings.
In February, the Japanese authorities continued heavy intervention, 18 days out of 20 business days, but the amount was less than half of January. In March, the Japanese authorities intervened from March 1 to March 16, every business day but one (March 12). In particular, on
March 5, more than 1 trillion yen was sold, and the yen/dollar rate apparently changed up from 108 yen/dollar to 111 yen/dollar. On March 8, more than 800 billion yen was sold again, to push the rate to 112 yen/dollar (intraday low of the yen in Tokyo). Pushing the dollar up (rather than preventing the dollar from going down (lean-against-the-wind) raised some eyebrows in Japan and the United
States. 12 In retrospect, it can be argued that the monetary authorities tried to push the yen to depreciate to create room for flexibility above 100 yen before terminating intervention. 
Reaction Function
Ito (2003) showed that Japanese interventions can be explained by a reaction function that includes the recent changes of the exchange rate, and the deviation from the long-run averages. Below I
propose an additional term involving the net long position of the yen in the IMM. Results, shown in Table 2 , can be interpreted as follows. φ 1 > 0 implies that the yen-selling intervention tends to occur if the yen appreciated the day before (from the two days earlier). φ4 > 0 implies that yen-selling interventions tend to occur if IMM net long positions become large, evidence of fighting against yen appreciation pressures exerted by speculators. φ5 < 0 implies that yen-selling interventions tend to occur when the net short position becomes large, reflecting the yen depreciation pressure. It shows that the monetary authorities did respond to IMM, but with asymmetric reactions. When the yen long position is large, interventions were conducted to prevent appreciation; when a yen short position develops, the monetary authorities also take advantage to depreciate the yen. The latter situation was most prominent from mid-February to Another test of evaluating intervention is tactical effectiveness. If slowing down the yen appreciation was the objective, did intervention have an impact on the exchange rate on the day of intervention? Ito (2003) proposed a method of evaluating the effectiveness of Japanese intervention. The change in the daily exchange rate is regressed on the change in the past exchange rate (lagged once, and the cumulative change for a week in the past, and the deviation from the long-run average) and interventions (Japanese intervention, US intervention, and Japanese first-of-the-week intervention). 15 The specification is: where s t = s t -s t-1 , s t is the NY close of the yen/dollar exchange rate, and s MA is the long-run, here 180 days, backward moving average. The first three terms in the right-hand-side are supposed to capture movement of the yen/dollar rate without interventions. If one strongly believes that the exchange rate follows a random walk, then a condition, β 0 =β 1 =β 2 =0, should be imposed. However, in general, a short-run bandwagon effect (0<β 1 <1) and a medium run mean-reversion (β 2 <0) may be present, and this specification allows for such behavior. Int t is the
Japanese intervention amounts; IntUS t is the U.S. intervention amounts (in yen). IntIN t denotes the first-in-the-week interventions (that is the cross of the indicator function of no intervention in the past five days and Int t ): IntIN t = Int t if Int t 0 and Int t-1 =Int t-2 =…=Int t-5 =0, or, otherwise,
IntIN t = 0. This term captures the power of infrequent, "surprise" interventions, as opposed to continuous interventions. Interventions are often done in clusters, that is, one intervention tends to be followed by others. This can be explained by political costs for interventions (obtaining an approval and forming consensus carries bureaucratic costs) being lower once intervention is done.
(See Ito and Yabu (2004) for more details on this line of thought.) Equation (2) has been estimated for the three subperiods (pre-Sakakibara, Sakakibara-Kuroda, and Mizoguchi). The results are shown in Table 5 . Interventions were effective in that the yen-selling interventions depreciated the yen, and the yen-buying interventions appreciated the yen in the second and third subperiods. Effectiveness of the interventions (β 3 ) was halved in period 3 compared to period 2. One-trillion yen interventions depreciated the yen only 0.7% in the second period and 0.38% in the third period. Moreover, one trillion yen 15 See Dominguez and Frankel (1993) , Dominguez (2003) , and Sarno and Taylor (2001) for general references on the effectiveness of interventions. This specification follows Ito (2003) . See Truman (2003) for a skeptical view on the effectiveness of interventions. first-time-in-a-week intervention (effects of β 3 +β 5 ) depreciated the yen by 2.1 percent in the second sub-period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , while it depreciated the yen only by 0.45% in the third period (2003) (2004) .
In sum, the interventions were effective in the Mizoguchi stealth interventions but the degree of impact declined to the level of 1/2 in general, and 1/5 in first-time-in-a-week interventions. There may be several reasons for the decline in the effectiveness in the third period, compared to the second period. First, stealth intervention may be a worse tactic. If signaling was to be given, then announcement of the fact that interventions are carried out should amplify the effect. The weight of intervention in the total turnovers every day is very small even with a large intervention. So, any effect has to be working on the expectation of the market participants.
Intervention cannot be very effective if the fact of interventions is deliberately kept confidential.
Second, too frequent interventions may reduce the effectiveness of intervention. Surprise intervention is highly effective by sending new information to the market. However, continuous interventions do not convey any information to the market. Third, the market detected disagreement-whether true or false-between the Japanese and other G7 authorities over the desirability of the Japanese interventions. This was most highlighted in August-September 2003.
The fact that speculative positions were built up so much in late August 2003 was the result of this.
In a sense, the Japanese authorities kept intervening from September 2003 to March 2004 to reverse expectations of speculators (broadly defined). In the meantime, more interventions did not move the rate. That interventions stopped soon after net long positions disappeared in Chicago attest to this interpretation. Fourth, suppose that the Japanese authorities were defending a particular rate, which they deny. Then the success means that the rate does not move. That econometric results show no effect on the exchange rate when interventions were carried out is not a sign of ineffectiveness but a sign of effectiveness. In a sense, the regression is mis-specified, if the objective was to defend the line but not to rebound.
Cost of Intervention
For developing countries, large-scale interventions to sell domestic currencies and build up large foreign reserves, usually are considered to be too costly, because the domestic interest rate is higher than the U.S. interest rate. However, in the case of Japan, the domestic interest rate was significantly lower than the U.S. interest rate. Therefore funding intervention by issuing yen-denominated Financial Bills (FBs) and purchasing U.S. Treasury Bills and U.S. Treasury Bonds has been a profitable operation. Ito (2003) Another possible risk of intervention can be the depletion of foreign reserves, when the monetary authorities are selling foreign assets. However, in Japan, the direction of intervention has been to purchase foreign assets since 1998, so that theoretically, there is no limit for such an operation. Therefore, Japanese interventions were not costly on either dimension. 
Consistency with Monetary Policy
In order to fight deflation, the BOJ has adopted the zero interest rate policy. 16 Funding for 35 trillion yen operations was virtually at no borrowing cost, while investing in U.S. paper carried 2 to 3% interest rates depending on the maturities. Therefore, the more foreign reserves, the more net interest income.
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When deflation is a problem, small inflationary pressure resulting from unsterilized intervention is no harm. In fact, Svensson (2001) advocated unsterilized, unlimited intervention as a fool-proof way of getting out of intervention in Japan. Since the institutional framework for intervention in Japan-issuing fiscal bills to obtain yen cash and intervene to purchase foreign securities-guarantees automatic sterilization, the BOJ has to expand the monetary base in tandem with interventions if unsterilized intervention is pursued. Although there was no explicit cooperation for unsterilized intervention from the BOJ, the monetary base was expanded in 2003, unlike the earlier episode. This was implemented by an increase in the target of the current account at the BOJ, that is, effectively excess reserves. base, as shown in Figure 2 . However, this was probably no more than coincidence.
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The point is that interventions themselves were no cost or constraint to monetary policy in the deflationary environment in 2003, whether or not the BOJ was willing to expand monetary base.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has reviewed the experience of Japanese macroeconomic development and currency is declining reflecting a fall in exports.
-0.5
May Adjustments in economic activities have been under way, as production is declining reflecting a fall in exports.
Jun Adjustments in economic activities are gradually intensifying, as production is declining substantially reflecting a fall in exports.
-1.0
July Adjustments in economic activities are intensifying, as production is declining substantially reflecting a fall in exports.
-1.0 Aug Adjustments in economic activities are intensifying further, reflecting a substantial decline in exports and production.
-1.0 Sept Adjustments in economic activity are becoming more severe, as the substantial decline in production, starting from a fall in exports, is beginning to have a negative influence on employment and income conditions.
-1.5
Oct Adjustments in economic activity are becoming more severe, as the substantial decline in production has a negative influence on employment and income conditions. In addition, the terrorist attacks in the U.S. have further heightened uncertainty in Japan's economy.
Nov Adjustments in economic activity are becoming more severe, as the substantial decline in production is beginning to have an adverse effect on private consumption through decreases in employment and income.
-1.5 Dec Japan's economy is deteriorating broadly, as private consumption is weakening in addition to a decline in exports and business fixed investment.
-2.0 Jan Japan's economy is deteriorating broadly, as private consumption is weakening in addition to a decline in exports and business fixed investment.
-2.0 Feb Japan's economy continues to deteriorate. -2.0 Mar Japan's economy still continues to deteriorate as a whole, although the downward pressure from exports and inventories is gradually abating.
-1.5 Apr Japan's economy still continues to deteriorate as a whole, but the pace has moderated somewhat.
May The pace of deterioration in Japan's economy has moderated, with production starting to pick up reflecting the increase in exports and progress in inventory adjustment.
Jun Japan's economy shows signs of stabilizing with a distinct increase in exports and a pick-up in production, although domestic private demand remains weak.
-0.5 July Japan's economy, despite continued weakness in domestic demand, has almost stabilized as a whole with an increasing upward impetus from exports and production, and an improvement in corporate profits and business sentiment. Notes: Heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors are given in parentheses. †Statistically significant at the 10-percent level.
*Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
**Statistically significant at the 1-percent level Estimated with a GARCH model. ** statistically significant at the 1-percent level.
* statistically significant at the 5-percent level. † statistically significant at 10-percent level.
Notes: see Ito (2003) for the details of the first two periods, and see for the third period. 
